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1. Introduction
Globally,  over  the  last  few  decades,  women's  economic  and  social  well-being  has
improved substantially. However, gender inequality is still widespread, and particularly so within
developing countries. Empirical evidence from a number of countries establishes the fact that
women still have substantial disadvantages over men, both within households and in economic
and social life (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997; Dreze and Sen, 1995;  Filmer, King and
Pritchett, 1998).
The persistence of female deprivation is generally attributed to a combination of social
and cultural norms as well as being a result of various market failures.  At the same time, a large
body of empirical studies  across many developing countries, in particular in Asia and Africa,
consistently shows that improvements in women's  education, health, employment opportunities
and  social  participation,  can  generate  substantial benefits.  Investment  in  women not  only
benefits  women  themselves  but  also  has  relatively  high  social  returns  reflected  in  an
improvement in their children's  welfare  and  a reduction of fertility, poverty and  gender bias
(Summners,  1992; Subbarao  et al,  1993; Quibria,  1993).'  Therefore,  gender-focused public
policies are desirable not only from the perspective of social justice,  but also because of the
substantial social and economic benefits  which result directly from enhancing women's  social
and economic status both within the household and in society as a whole. Also, the importance of
market failures in determining outcomes suggests a potentially important role for public polices
aimed at improving the welfare of women.
Summers  (1992,  p1)argues that  "an extensive  body  of recent  research  conducted  at the World  Bank  and
elsewhere has convinced me that once its benefits are recognized, investments in girls' education may well
be the highest return investment available in the developing world".There  is  substantial  evidence  supporting  the  conclusions  that  Chinese  women  have
achieved  higher  levels  of  well-being  compared  to  their  counterparts  in  other  developing
countries.  A comparison of a range of development indicators illustrates this  point strikingly.
Based on statistics from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank, female
life expectancy  at birth  in  19922 was 71  for China,  59 for  India, 59 for Pakistan and  62 for
Indonesia.  Female literacy rates in the same year were 68% for China, 39% for India, 22% for
Pakistan and  77% for Indonesia. In 1992, the birth rate per  thousand in China was  19, while
India's  birth rate was as high as 29 and the average figure for poor countries excluding China and
India was 37.  It is widely believed that, to large extent, much of this achievement in improving
women's  welfare can be attributed to the  implementation and enforcement of a wide range of
gender-focused public policies over the past few decades (Das Gupta et al, 2001).
All  the  above  statistics  illustrate  China's  success  in  empowering  women  and  in
combating  deep-rooted feudal values,  which  would  otherwise  have  largely excluded  Chinese
women both socially and economically.  However, despite China's  attractive record in this area,
there  exist  surprisingly  few  empirical  studies  evaluating  gender-focused  public  polices  and
programs. Recent work includes a case study by the All-China Woman's Federation (1993) and
the  World Bank study by Coletta  and  Sutton (1989), but none  of these is based  on rigorous
empirical analysis of survey data.  This may be due partly to the  lack of attention paid inside
China tc collecting quantitative survey data on this topic.
Recently, however, several national surveys have been conducted in China focusing on
assessing women's social and economic status. These include: (1) the 1991 Survey of Women's
Status  in  Contemporary  China,  (2)  the  1991  Survey  of  Female  Science  and  Technology
Employees, (3) the 1992 Survey of the Situation of Children, and (4) the 1993 Survey of Female
2  We chose  1992  so as to coincide  with  the implementation  of the Chinese  rural community  program  under
evaluation  in  this paper. Detailed  discussion  of the project  is presented  in Section  2 below.
4Cardres.  Research based on these national surveys has been published within China (Tao and
Jian, 1993; Wang, 1993; China Statistical Bureau, 1993; and Yie, 1997). These surveys provide a
rich data source for analyzing and assessing Chinese women's social and economic status as well
as for identifying key determinants of women's well-being.
But  these surveys  are not specially designed for the  purposes of program and policy
evaluations.  However, the 1996 household survey collected for the purpose of evaluating the so-
called Population Control and Community Development Project, which has recently been made
publicly available, is unique  in this  respect. The program, initiated by  the Central Population
Planning Committee 3,  was implemented in villages across 34  county towns in rural China in
1993.  In 1996, three years after program implementation, a household survey was conducted for
57  villages,  with  38  treatment  villages  and  19  control  villages.  Detailed  socio-economic
information on women and households was collected in the  survey, and the questionnaire was
specifically designed to collect information on women's economic and social participation within
villages.
The availability of such a survey provides us with  an unique opportunity to formally
evaluate  the  impact  of  gender-based  public  interventions  in  the  Chinese  context.  To  our
knowledge, no rigorous program evaluation has been carried out using this data. Using this data,
in this paper we attempt to evaluate the economic and social impact of the program on the rural
communities.  We address  the  following  questions. First,  can  such a  community program be
transformed  into  human  and  social  capital,  which  increases  women's  (or  their  family's)
productivity, narrowly measured by their income-generating capacity?  Second, does the program
generate external benefits  at the village  level in the  form of influencing the incomes of non-
participants as well as participants?  Thirdly, how important is the program's  ability to increase
the level of participation within villages for its ability to generate income impacts?  Finally, are
5there  social  benefits  associated  with  such  gender-focused  programs,  in  particular,  through
impacts on children's welfare as well as on women's fertility decisions and gender preferences?
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we  provide both an overview of
gender-focused public policy in China and details of the nature of the community program being
evaluated.  In Section 3 we discuss the survey data used in our analysis and the methodology
used to analyse this data.  Section 4 presents the results from our empirical analysis. Section 5
concludes.
2.  Gender-Focused Public Policy and the Community Program
In this section we first provide an overview of gender-focused public policy in China and
its role in improving the well-being of Chinese women. We then describe the specific community
program to be analysed in this paper.
2.1 Gender-Focused Public Policy in China
As pointed out above, Chinese women have experienced a significant improvement in
their well-being compared with women in many other low-income countries.  This suggests that
important policy insights may be gleaned from improving our understanding of the underlying
factors that have contributed to higher women's  welfare in China, a country ranked among the
poorest countries in the world in the 1990s.  To this end, a brief overview of China's  history of
gender-focused public polices is thus helpful.
The  Chinese  government  has  played  an  active  role  in  implementing  and  enforcing
gender-based public policies in key areas since as early as the  1950s.  Specific public polices
were designed particularly to:  (I)  improve women's  education, health care, and employment
3One  of the key organisations  in the central  government  responsible  for formulating  population  policies  and
their implementation  nationwide.
6opportunities,  (2)  promote  women's  social  and  political  involvement  at  all  levels  of
administration, and (3) establish a legal and institutional framework to protect woman's  property
rights  and  to  promote  equality  in  employment  opportunities,  access  to  basic  services, and
participation in political life. In principle at least, the implementation of public policies designed
to promote women's  well-being has been made mandatory nation wide with particular attention
paid to rural and poor areas where women's  deprivation was deeper and more widespread (Tao
and Jian, 1997).4
One  of  the  most  significant  achievements  in  of  China  since  1949  has  been  the
widespread public provision of basic services in education and health care and its focus on equal
access.  Based on figures published by the Research Institute of All China Women's Federation
(1991) between the early 1950s to late 1980s, the number of health clinics (focusing particularly
on providing primary health care for women and children) increased from 349 to 2,793 in urban
areas, and from 2,880 to 11,795 in rural areas.  This clearly has contributed to the improvement
of health outcomes for women and children.  For example, female life expectancy at birth has
increased from 35 years in the early  1960s to 71 in the early  1990s (The  World Bank, 2000).
The focus  on  investment in social infrastructure included  setting up evening  schools and the
provision of literacy classes  in local communities, and this  has undoubtedly  been one  of the
major  factors  explaining  the  rapid  reduction  of  adult  (particularly  female)  illiteracy rates.
Chinese official statistics show that the female illiteracy rate fell from 64% in  1970 to 24% in
1998 (Research Institute of All China Women's Federation, 1998).
This overview of public policy in China reveals not only its gender focus but also the
recognition of the complementarity between different sets of policies. It has been recognised that
women's  status can only be improved when a  supporting legal and institutional framework is
4  One expects,  however,  that the vigour  with  which  these  policies  are implemented  varies  depending,  for
example,  on the nature  of the policy,  on the region,  and on the commitment  of local leaders  to the particular
policy.
7well established, an area where govemment intervention is particularly crucial. To this end, the
land reforms  in  1950 endorsed the  equal  entitlement of land  between men  and  women. The
marriage  law,  introduced  in  1957  and  further  modified  in  1985,  was  geared  towards  the
protection of women's  welfare both within and outside the family.  In addition, various programs
were implemented aimed at raising the awareness of women's legal rights and providing women
with legal information and advice services (Wu and Cheng, 1997). School attendance  both for
boys and girls was made mandatory as early as the  1970s. This has had a profound impact on
increasing female school enrolment and reducing intra-household gender bias, as reflected in the
fact that female enrolment rates in primary and middle schools increased from 33% to 45% and
25% to 40%, respectively, between 1950 and the early 1990s.
The Chinese government has also  emphasized women's  participation  in political life.
According to  statistics published  by the Research Institute of All China Women's  Federation
(1998), the proportion of female parliament members was around 12% in the 1950s and rose to
over 21% in the  1990s.  Female political party membership has been as high as around 40% of
total membership since the 1970s, and women accounted for over one third of political carders. 5
Another  indicator, t".e proportion of female staff engaged in scientific research, which reflects
both female educational achievement and gender equality, shows that women have accounted for
over one third of the staff in this profession since the 1970s.
Clearly, China's  success in improving women's status is undoubtedly associated with its
long history of implementing gender-focused public polices and programs. Thus, there are likely
to be important policy lessons to be learnt from the Chinese experience.  Empirical research, in
particular  focusing  on  evaluating  public  programs,  is  extremely  valuable  in  this  regard.
Unfortunately, empirical  research in this  area has been  sparse, partly  due to data  limitations.
However, even  when data sources were available, the studies carried out (e.g. Peng and Dai,
5 A cadre is a high-ranking  political  appointee.
81996 and Lin, 1997) tended to focus more on qualitative case studies with little attention paid to
quantitatively evaluating the impact of existing public programs. In this paper, we aim to fill this
gap. Using the 1996 household survey, we attempt to evaluate the economic and social  impact of
a specific gender -focused public program.
2.2  The Community Program
The  Population  Control  and  Community  Development  Project  is  a  gender-focused
community program. The key objectives of the program are: (i) to help women identify a range
of potential economic and social opportunities, and (ii) to facilitate the development of public
and  community institutions  to  enable  women to  exploit these  opportunities.  In a  sense, the
program is an example of what Uphoff (1992, p273) refers to as a "top-down" intervention aimed
at introducing, sustaining and institutionalizing "bottom-up" development.
This  project  was  designed  primarily  to  evaluate  the  impact  on  women's  fertility
decisions  of  public  interventions  aimed  at  enhancing  women's  economic  and  social
opportunities. It is being recognised more widely in China, both among policy practitioners and
within the research community focusing on assessing population policies, that family planning
polices can be more effectively  implemented and enforced through providing women with more
social  and  economic  opportunities  than  by  simply  deploying  coercive  measures  aimed  at
controlling  population  growth.  Leading  sociologists  and  demographers  in  China  have  also
become more  aware of  the  potential  impact  of community development  programs on  social
norms, e.g. regarding gender preference and desired family size (e.g. Peng and Dai, 1996). As a
result,  a  team  of  population  experts  (including  both  policy  practitioners  from  the  Central
Population  Bureau  and scholars  from the  Population  Research Institute at  Fudan University)
initiated, designed and implemented this community program.  The program was implemented in
91993 in over 37 xian6 across 17 provinces (out of 28) in China.  In all, 57 relatively poor villages
across rural  areas were chosen to evaluate the program, with 38 villages chosen as treatment
villages where the program was implemented and the other  19 villages used as a control group
(i.e. without intervention).'  The data collected relate to the year  1996, three years after program
implementation. Several qualitative case studies in a few villages have been carried out to assess
the impact of this program (Dai and Peng, 1996; Lin, 1997) and the findings suggest a positive
program impact in terms of reducing preferred family size, reducing gender bias, and increasing
women's participation in community life.
The  community  program  has  both  economic  and  social  dimensions.  The  program
involved  agricultural  seminars  and  extension  services,  organised  cultural  and  entertainment
activities (e.g. dancing groups, chess clubs and reading groups), and political meetings. One of
the special features of this project is its emphasis on the development of human and social capital
rather  than  providing financial  aid.  Therefore, direct  financial  support  from central  or local
government is very limited. Village leaders in the treatment group were given seminars on the
importance  of community development, women's  participation and  their  impact on  women's
fertility attitudes.  Women were given priority access to agricultural extension services initiated
and  supported  by  local  government,  including information  on  new  farming  technology,  and
training and technical assistance.  Agricultural technicians were invited to give advice on farming
techniques  mostly suitable  for local conditions  and  on various productive  activities  to which
woman  are  better  suited.  Based  on  the  principle  of  self-sufficiency  and  self-development,
financial  resources for  setting up  village  libraries, reading rooms or  social and entertainment
facilities  come  mainly from  the taxation  of  village  enterprises and/or  reallocation  of village
general funds.
6A  xian is a collection  of neighbouring  villages.
7 Program  organisers  claimed  that the choice  of villages  participating  in  the program  was made  randomly,
but we also  test this in  our analysis.
10The experience of Luochun, one of the treatment villages, provides a specific example of
the program (Dai and Peng, 1996). In 1993, Luochun  had  annual per capita income around 500
yuan  ($75) and  an average  number of  children  per  woman of 3.5.  It had  been  traditionally
underdeveloped and backward in many respects.  Community social activities were particularly
lacking and most women were confined to domestic life. Through the community development
project,  employment  opportunities  for  women  in  areas  such  as  apple  processing,  tobacco
processing,  and  marketing  of  the  local  traditional  handicrafts  (e.g.  embroidery)  have  been
identified as effective ways of promoting women's economic participation. Also, as a result of
the program, a reading room and an entertainment hall were built to improve women's  social
involvement in community life.
An important feature of the program is its emphasis on enhancing women's social as well
as economic participation  in the community. Improving women's  access to  income generating
opportunities is obviously expected to result in higher incomes. However, a more recent body of
literature  also  draws  attention  to  the  notion  of  social  capital  and  its  links  with  social
participation.  The concept of social capital, according to Putnam (I993),  refers  to features of
social organisation and participation, such as trust, norms and networks. 8 Social capital formed
through individual participation in social life, it is argued, shares the same features as physical
and human capital which  are productive  in terms of income-generating activities.  In addition,
social  capital  has  externalities  in  the  sense  that  higher  levels  of  social  capital  in  local
communities can benefit  participants and non-participants alike. 9 According to Woolcock and
8  See  Woolcock  and  Narayan  (2000) for a useful  review  of the literature  from  the perspective  of economic
development,  including  Narayan  and Pritchett  (1997),  Knack  (1997),  Knack  and Keefer  (1995),  Grootaert
(1999),  and Maluccio,  Haddad  and  May (2000). See  Coleman  (1988)  and Fukuyama  (1995)  for details  of
the extensive  discussion  of social  capital  in the sociology  literature.
9 There  are many forms  of social  capital;  here we are more  concerned  with  the more  inclusive community-
level social  capital  than with  the exclusive social  connections  considered  by, for example,  Olson  (1982),
Borjas  (1994),  Migdal  (1987)  and Case and Katz  (1991).
11Narayan  (2000,  p226),  empirical  evidence  suggests  a  wide  range  of  benefits  from  the
accumulation of social capital:
Those communities endowed with a diverse stock of social networks and civic
associations  are  in  a  stronger  position  to  confront  poverty  and  vulnerability
(Moser, 1996; Narayan, 1995), resolve disputes (Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 2000),
and take advantage of new opportunities (Isham, 1999).A  defining feature of
being poor, moreover, is that one is not a member of - or may even be actively
excluded from - certain  social networks and institutions that could be used to
secure jobs and decent housing (Wilson, 1987, 1996)."
The authors thus also recognize (p231) that "imputing only desirable outcomes to social capital,
or equating them with it, ignores the possibility that these outcomes may be attained at another
group's  expense".
The literature on social capital suggests that there  are a number of ways through which
social participation can be income enhancing.  Firstly, voluntary co-operation is more likely to
occur in a community where the stock of social capital is abundant leading to superior economic
outcomes in compariscn to those from non-cooperative behaviour.  In particular,  social capital
can enhance  greater co-operation and collective  action  in the provision of local public goods.
Secondly,  social  capital  reduces  the  cost  of  information,  thus  lowering  transaction  costs,
increasing the volume of mutually beneficial trading,  and facilitating  the diffusion of modern
technology.  Thirdly,  greater  social  capital  can  to  some extent  compensate  for  information
imperfections that could form barriers to many economic activities taking place.  For example,
many  economically beneficial  investments may not take  place if credit  or insurance markets
function badly due to  imperfect information.  Fourthly,  social capital can compensate  for the
absence  of  formal  legal  and political  institutions  by  encouraging  economic  activities  in the
absence  of  enforceable  contracts,  supporting  the  socially  efficient  management  of  natural
resources, and promoting responsible citizenship.
The concept  of social capital  is broadened  and enriched  when  it is discussed  in the
context  of  women's  empowerment.  If  the  formation  of  social  capital  is  through  women's
12participation in society, then  the evidence identified earlier suggests that  substantial economic
and social benefits can be generated.  In this paper, we aim to empirically test this widely held
view in the context of the Chinese experience.
3.  Data and Methodology
In this section we present a brief discussion of the data used in the analysis.  This is then
followed by an explanation of the methodology used to evaluate the social and economic impact
of the program.
3.1 Data
Although the survey and the community program were primarily designed to assess the
impact of a woman's participation in community life on her fertility preferences, the information
available from the survey is sufficiently extensive to allow us to address a somewhat broader set
of issues related to women's  economic and social participation.  The survey collected detailed
information  in  three  areas:  (1)  household  socio-economic  data;  (2)  women's  community
participation activities; and (3) women's attitudes to gender and fertility issues. This information
was collected for both control and treatment households in 1996; the absence of baseline data for
1993 obviously restricts the nature of our analysis (e.g. we are unable to control for unobserved
individual fixed effects).  Table l a provides a statistical summary of the survey data for both sets
of villages and Table  lb describes some of the variables in more detail and how they enter into
our regression analysis.
A central objective of our analysis is to determine  if the program has some features of
capital (i.e. both economic and social), which increase income.  To the extent that the control and
treatment localities were randomly selected, a simple comparison of mean income across both
groups can provide an unbiased estimate  of the program impact  on income.  However, from
13Table  la  we  can see that many variables, which  one would assume to  be exogenous (i.e. not
influenced by the program, at least within a three-year period) do in fact differ.  For example, the
mean  levels of education, land size, age and number of laborers differ  across the control and
treatment  villages.  Also,  the  control  households  are disproportionately  concentrated  in the
Northern region while the treatment households are disproportionately concentrated in the South-
West region.  These differences cause concerns regarding the randomness of program assignment
to  communities  in  practice.  Below  we  discuss the  methodology employed  in  the  paper  to
evaluate the impact of the program and to deal with potential problems arising from endogenous
program placement and/or self-selection issues relevant to program evaluation.10
3.2  Methodology
In line with the above discussion of the data and the implications for estimating program
impact, we first compare mean income levels in control and treatment areas based on household-
level data.  To  control for  observed heterogeneity  across  households, we  then  estimate  the
program impact on income using multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques
based on the following equation:
log yi =x  +  3  X j+ 6 Vpdi  + ui
where y, is annual household income and Xi includes socio-economic variables such as the age
and  education  of  both husband  and  wife,  number  of  labourers, land  size,  and  location  (i.e.
regional)  dummies.  The  error  terms  ui's  are  assumed  to  follow  independently  identical
distributions. The variable Vpd is a dummy capturing (village) program participation  - that is,
takes the  value  unity for  households  in "treatment"  villages and  zero  for  those in  "control"
villages.  However, Vpd cannot be treated as exogenous  if, for example, the choice of program
'° For detailed  discussion  on these issues  see,  for example,  Heckman  (1979, 1996, 1997),  Heckman  and
Robb  (1985),  Rosenzweig  and Wolpin  (1986)  and Pitt, Rosenzweig  and  Gibbons  (1995).
14placement is not random, e.g. if high-income villages are more likely to secure participation in
the program or if officials selecting villages for participation in the program bias the selection in
favour of poorer villages.  To control for such possible endogenous selection of villages into the
program, we therefore use an instrumental variables approach, replacing Vpd with its predicted
value derived from a  probit regression of  Vpd on X plus additional identifying variables. This
requires the identification of a valid instrument variable, i.e. one which is highly correlated with
program  selection  but  not  correlated  with  income.  We  discuss  the  choice  of  instrumental
variables in Section 4.
For  our  analysis  of  the  interdependence  between  individual  participation  and  the
program in determining income, we add to the above equation the variable Ipd, an individual
participation  dummy  based  on  whether the  individual  participates  in  a  range of community
activities associated with the program. Again, since there may be a two-way relationship between
individual  participation  and  income,  we  estimate  this  model  using  instrumental-variable
techniques. We also interact the program dummy with Ipd to try to capture the distribution of
program benefits across those households that participate in the community activities and those
that don't.
However, the above model is restrictive in that it ignores the fact that individuals that are
more likely to  benefit from (i.e. have a comparative advantage in) participating in community
activities are in turn more likely to be observed participating. To allow for such self-selection, we
also estimate the following "switching regression" model (Maddala, 1983):
log yi  = al  + PI  X 11 + y, Vpd + u,;  (for participants)
log Y2i  =  a2 + 132  X 2i + Y2  Vpd +  u2i  (for non-participants)
I* = 0 Z, + V,  (participation decision)
with 1*  interpreted as a latent variable where we observe participation (i.e. Ipd=l) if 1>O  and non-
participation  (i.e. Ipd=O) if  1  <O.  Note that, in  addition to  the X variables,  Z contains extra
15variables  thought to  affect  participation decisions,  but not income.  We estimate  the  income
equations separately for participants and non-participants, controlling for endogenous selection
using Heckman's two-stage estimation technique. Finally, in order to analyse how the program
impact depends on its ability to increase participation rates within villages, we add an extra term
to  these  equations, namely, the proportion  of households participating  within each village  in
which the household resides (Vpdlevel) and its interaction with the program dummy.
Finally, we capture the social benefits of the community program in terms of its effects
on  women's  decisions  on  children's  education  expenditures,  fertility  decisions,  and  gender
attitudes. These variables are admittedly rather narrow and only partially capture the notion of
social benefits, but this limitation is mainly due to data availability in the survey.  We assess the
social benefits of the program based on three separate reduced form equations: (1) expenditure
on  children's  education, (2)  gender  preference  indicators; and  (3)  fertility  preferences.  The
estimated coefficients of the program dummy variable  in these equations should capture their
social benefits. As above, we also address the problem of possible non-randomness of program
placement.
4. Empirical Results
In this section we present the results from our empirical analysis in the following three
areas. First, we analyse the impact of the program on household incomes and test for evidence of
program placement bias.  Second, we assess the program's impact on participation levels as well
as the relationship  between the programs ability to increase incomes and its ability to increase
participation.  This is an important empirical issue as the key objective of the program is not only
to increase the effectiveness of existing participation in generating income but also to bring about
an  increase  in  participation rates  within villages.  Thirdly, we  test  whether the  program also
16generates social externalities, i.e. the program impact on the welfare of children and reduction of
fertility and gender bias?
4.1  The Program's Impact on HouseholdIncomes
In  so  far as  the  control  and  treatment  localities  were  randomly  selected, a  simple
comparison of mean incomes provides an unbiased estimate of the program impact on income.
Table  la  presents such a comparison and Table  lb summarises the definitions of variables used
in the following analysis.  Focusing on the total household income, the comparison across control
and treatment  villages indicates that the  program increases total household income by  nearly
27%,  suggestive  of a  high  economic return  to the  program.  However, any deviations from
random  selection will  mean  that  this  is  a  biased  estimate  if  both  sets of  villages  differed
systematically  in  terms of  income-generating characteristics  (e.g.  landholdings,  labourers,  or
access to income-earning opportunities outside of agriculture) prior to the program.  Since the
program is expected to generate benefits, it is possible that villages with higher average incomes
or with more political influence tend to be better informed and have stronger bargaining power in
securing such programs. Alternatively, officials may bias selection for program participation in
favour of poorer villages.
Either  way,  neglecting  the  issue  of  endogenous  program  placement  can  have  the
consequence that interpretations of any empirical results can be misleading as to causal impacts.
Therefore, testing for the endogeneity of village selection is an important part of our empirical
investigation of the underlying direction of causality.  Using OLS multivariate analysis, where
we include a range of explanatory variables that could capture such systematic differences across
control and treatment households, we can control for observed heterogeneity across households."
However, we  also need to allow for the possible selection of villages based on unobservable
Of course,  in  the absence  of baseline  data for 1993  we are unable  to control  for unobserved  differences.
17characteristics, which affect the choice of program placement.  We address the issue of a possible
simultaneous determination of income and village participation using the instrumental variables
(IV) technique.
Table  2  presents the  results from our analysis of the program's  impact on  household
incomes  using  OLS  and  IV  estimation  methods.  To  implement  IV  estimation  we  need
instruments that do not affect income directly but which affect participation in the program.  As
an instrument we choose the proportion of women interviewed in each village that are classified
as party carders (i.e. high-ranking political appointees). 1 2
Columns  I  and 2  in Table  2 summarize the key  results  of the  income impact of the
program.  Our OLS estimate (column  1) of the  income impact of the program shows that the
presence  of  the  program  increases  income by  19.4%.  But  if village  income and  program
participation have an influence on each other, then our OLS estimate of the program effect is in
general biased. Using IV estimation we can get a consistent estimate of the direct impact of the
program on village  income.  Our IV estimation  (column 2) produces  a  larger estimate of the
impact of program participation: village participation in the program appears to lead to a 28%
increase in income consistent with a strong causal link from the program to income.' 3
4.2  The Importance  of Individual Participation
An important objective of the program is to increase both the level and effectiveness of
women's  participation  in the economic and social  life of their community.  In this section we
analyse the interaction between individual participation, the program and household income.  We
proceed  in two steps.  First, we test whether there  is a  causal relationship between  individual
12 We found  that the instrument  was statistically  insignificant  when  included  in the income  equation,  with  a
coefficient  of -0.22 and a t-statistic  of 1.03  (column  3, Table  2), yet highly  significant  when  used  to explain
program  placement,  with  a coefficient  of 26.4 and a t-statistic  of 3  5.7  (column  4, Table  2). We also  tried  to
identify  a number  of other  possible  instruments  but without  success.
18participation and income, and whether the program impacts differently on participants and non-
participants. Secondly, we analyse the extent to which the program's impact on incomes depends
on its ability to increase village-level participation rates.
The Role of Individual Participation
Table 3 presents the results of our analysis of how the program affects participation rates
as well as how the income impact of the program differs across participants and non-participants.
Column  1  presents  the  probit  regression  with  the  individual  participation  dummy  as  the
dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on the treatment dummy indicates that the program
has a large positive and highly significant impact the probability of participation, increasing it by
nearly  25%  (i.e. the  marginal effected  based  on  the  coefficient  of  0.64).  Other  household
characteristics that were found to influence women's  participation decisions were her education
(positively), family size (negatively), and having a family heir (negatively).
What  is the  relationship  between  individual  participation  and  income? How  is  this
relationship influenced by the presence of the program? We address the first issue by introducing
the  individual  participation  dummy  into  the  OLS  income  regression.  Interacting  individual
participation with the program treatment dummy enables us to test whether the program impacts
differ  across participants and non-participants.  Our results using  OLS estimation (column 2)
indicate  that:  (1)  individual  participation  is  positively  associated  with  income,  (2)  the
relationship between individual participation  and income depends on whether one resides in a
treatment or control village, being higher in the former (at  17.6%) than in the latter (at 6.4%),
and (3) the impact of the program on income also differs according to whether one participates or
not, being larger for the former (at 22%) then for the latter (at 10.8%).
The  above results  indicate  that  individual participation  is positively  correlated  with
household income, and that the correlation differs across treatment and control villages. What
3 It is interesting  to note  that our IV estimate  is virtually  identical  to our estimate  of 27%  using  a simple
19about the direction of causation  between the income and individual participation?  We address
this issue by instrumenting individual (as well as program) participation (column 3).  We
instrument  individual  participation  using  information  in  the  survey  on  whether  or  not  the
household already has a "boy  heir" and whether the woman is a cadre, both being regarded as
correlated with participation decision but not with household income.  Both these variables were
insignificant  when  included  in  the  income  equation  (column  4)  yet  highly  significant  in
determining individual participation (column 1), with the probability of individual participation
being lower for a woman with a boy heir and higher if she is a cadre.  The IV estimates (column
3) suggest a somewhat different pattern of influences: the impact of individual participation on
income is still higher for those living in treatment villages (at 13%) but is now negative for those
living in control villages (at 273%).  Similarly, the effect of program treatment is positive for
participants (at 169%) and negative for non-participants (at -114%).
Although the sign pattern of our IV estimates of program impact is plausible, the same
cannot be said of the magnitudes.  This could be due to model mis-specification, i.e. not taking
account of self-selection by individuals.  We use the Heckman two-step  estimation procedure,
which  allows  for  scif-selection, to  deal with the  model  mis-specification  issue.  The  results,
reported in columns 5 and 6, show that both the sign and the magnitudes of the program effects
seem more plausible than that from the OLS.  Our estimates suggest that the program increases
the income of participants  by 62% but decreases non-participants income by around 20% (but
this latter effect is only significant at the 10% level). This finding indicates that the program may
generate some form of negative externalities for non-participants. In other words, in the presence
of the program, the benefit to participants comes partly at the expense of non-participants.  If this
is indeed the case, it raises the important question of how to design such programs so as to avoid
such adverse effects.
comparison  of unconditional  mean  incomes  acToss  control  and treatment  villages  in Table Ia.
20The Role of Village-Level Participation Rates
The above empirical evidence shows that (1) the program affects both participants and
non-participants very differently  and (2) the program is also extremely effective at increasing
participation rates within villages.  This raises the issues of the importance of the ability of the
program to increase participation rates for its ability to increase incomes.  To examine this issue,
in the income equation we add a variable reflecting village-level individual participation rates,
i.e. the proportion of women classified as participants in each village (Vpdlevel).  This variable is
interacted with the program treatment dummy, but does not enter  separately since we wish to
estimate the effect of the program inclusive of the effect due to increasing participation rates.
This  specification allows  the  impact of the  program on  participants  and non-participants  to
depend on  the level of participation  in the village.  The top part of the  Table  4 presents the
estimation  results.  We  estimate  an  income equation  separately  for  participants  and  non-
participants  using  the  Hecklnan  two-step  estimator  to  allow  for  endogenous  selection  in
individual participation.
The bottom  panel  of Table  4  presents  the  program impact  on  participants and  non-
participants for different participation rates within villages: the estimated coefficients presented
in the top panel are used to simulate the program impact at different levels of participation.  The
range of participation rates is chosen to reflect those observed in the sample: the participation
rates of 45% and 65% are the means for the control and treatment samples, respectively, and
55% is taken  as an  intermediate  rate.  Loosely speaking,  we can  interpret  45% as the  pre-
treatment rate and 65% as the post-treatment rate.1 4 Focusing on participants, our results suggest
that the magnitude of the program impact depends sensitively and positively on the ability of the
program to increase participation rates.  If the participation rate was to stay at its pre-treatment
14 This  is consistent  with  our  results  in Table 3, column  1.
21level (i.e. 45%)  then  incomes would only increase  by 3.1%:  we can  loosely interpret this  as
arising  from  the  program's  impact  in  increasing the  effectiveness  of existing  participation.
However, if the program increases the participation rate then its income impact will also increase
substantially, with each 10% point increase in participation rates associated approximately with a
20% increase in income.  This pattern suggests that most of the income gains generated by the
program can be attributed to the level effect on participation rates.
Focusing on  non-participants, the first  thing one  notices is that the program still  has
negative  effects.  Although  these  effects  are  not  statistically  significant,  their  pattern  is
interesting, with the negative impact on non-beneficiaries increasing with participation rates.  At
the  low  pre-treatment  participation  levels,  non-participants  experience  a  5.5%  decrease  in
income, again suggesting that some of the increased income gains for participants come at their
expense.  This negative spillover  effect on  non-participants  is larger the  more successful the
program is at  increasing participation rates.  A non-participant residing  in a village where the
participation rate is increased to 65% experiences an income loss of 16.6%.
To summarize, the ability of the program to  impact on household  incomes appears to
depend sensitively on its success  in increasing participation rates: both the positive impact on
participants' incomes and the negative impact on non-participants' incomes are stronger the more
successful the program is at  increasing participation rates.  In this sense, it appears that, in the
presence of the program, participation helps to protect one from negative spillover effects and to
buy into the income gains accruing to the village.
4.3  The Social Benefits  of Women's Participation
Recent  empirical  evidence  from  many  countries  has  repeatedly  shown  that  gender-
focused public policy generates substantial social externalities, including improvement of child
welfare (e.g. health, nutrition and education attainment) and reduction of gender bias and fertility
22rates. In this section we analyse some channels through which these benefits may emerge from
the program. However, quantifying the full extent of such social benefits is a formidable task as
the information required is difficult to obtain and measure accurately.
In our own analysis, we are faced with two principle difficulties. First, the spell between
the program implementation and  the survey (three years  from  1993 to  1996) is too short to
observe any significant change occurring within households for the types of indicators in which
we are interested in (e.g. fertility outcomes).  Secondly, information directly related to the issues
at  hand  is limited to  measures  of expenditure  on  children's  education  and  attitudes towards
fertility  and  gender  issues.  The potential  problem with  most  of the  attitudinal  questions  is
subjectivity,  reflecting  expressed  views  rather  than  revealed  preference  through  actions.
However, given the short spell between the program implementation and the survey, it is changes
in attitudes rather than any other indicators (such as lower gender discrimination in labor markets
or  lower fertility  rates) for  which  we  would expect the  program and  participation  to have a
significant impact.  Therefore, the analysis of attitudinal information may shed some light on the
potential effectiveness of such gender-based public programs, particularly from the perspective
of factors that affect family preferences (i.e. the demand side)." 5
Table  5 presents  the  results  of  our analysis of the  program's  impact  on  educational
expenditures on children, as well as on gender and fertility preferences.  Since in all cases the
OLS  and IV  estimates were  very  similar, we present  only the  latter.  We first  examine the
determinants of expenditures on children's education, including school fees and expenditure on
textbooks. The regression analysis shows that the program increases these expenditures by nearly
110 yuan, equivalent  to nearly a  17% increase from the mean level of 671 yuan observed in
control villages (Table Ia).  However, although the impact is large, it is statistically insignificant.
'5  It is commonly  argued,  for example,  that family  planning  programs  that focus  solely  on the supply  side
(i.e. providing  infornation  on and access  to family  planning  technologies)  are ineffective  in  the absence  of a
demand  for such services.
23Secondly,  we  explore  factors  that  affect  gender  and  fertility  attitudes.  Regarding  the  gender
question,  women  in  the  survey  were  asked:  (i)  Is  it essential,  given  social  attitudes,  for  a
household  to  have  a  male  child,  and  (ii)  Given  the  present  (i.e.  more  modern)  farming
technology, are male labourers still perceived as more important than their female counterparts?
Turning to gender question (i), which we interpret as mainly reflecting cultural values or social
norms, the probit estimation (column  2) indicates that the program has a substantial impact in
reducing  the  probability  of  preferring  boys  to  girls  (the  probability  of  such  a  gender  bias
decreases by 24 percentage points as a result of the program).  Our estimation on gender question
(ii) presented in column 3, i.e. whether there  is a premium attached to male labourers given the
existing  production  technology,  shows  that  the  program exerts  a  significant  impact  on  the
probability of valuing male over female labour (reducing it by 23 percentage points).
The community program and the survey was conducted with a focus on evaluating the
impact of gender-based public policy on women's fertility attitudes, so our empirical finding on
this issue is of particular interest. Our analysis focuses on the answers to the following question:
If family planning policies were to permit, would you want extra children? Our results indicate
that  the program has  a beneficial  impact  in terms  of reducing the desire  for larger  families,
resulting in a 7 percentage points decrease in the probability of wanting a larger family (column
4).  As expected, having a boy heir decreases this probability further by 5 percentage points.
The  above  results  taken  together  suggest  that  the  program  has  substantial  social
externalities  in  terms  of  expenditures  on  child  education  (i.e.  increasing  demand  for  child
quality), decreasing the demand for the quantity of children, and correcting gender biases that are
in favor of male children.  Thus, when combined with the income effects identified earlier, our
analysis provides empirical evidence to support the claim that the gender-focused programs that
emphasise promoting women participation in both economic and social community activities can
generate significant benefits.
245. Summary
In this  paper, we empirically analyse the  impact of a public program that focuses on
empowering rural Chinese women by increasing their level of economic and social participation
as well as its effectiveness.  We find support for the view that such programs can substantially
increase the household incomes of participants but that some of this  comes at the expense of
negative income externalities for non-participant households.  Our results also suggest that the
program is extremely  successful at  increasing participation rates  within villages and that  the
program's income impacts depend sensitively on the ability to achieve such increases.  The more
successful the program is at increasing participation rates the greater both the positive impact on
participants'  incomes  and  negative  impact  on  non-participants'  incomes,  with  the  former
substantially greater than the latter.  In this sense, in the presence of the program, the gains from
participation come from protecting oneself from these negative effects and from buying into the
substantial income gains accruing from increased participation rates.  We also analyse a range of
channels through which social benefits could emerge from the implementation of the community
program.  Our results indicate that the program has a significant positive influence on gender and
fertility attitudes as well as on children's welfare though increasing education expenditures.
In conclusion, then,  our results  support  the view that  public policies  geared towards
increasing women's  economic and  social participation can generate substantial economic and
social returns.  However, the finding that the program has negative income externalities for those
who  do  not participate  suggests that  it is important to  consider how  such programs may be
designed to avoid such adverse effects.  Our results also lend support to the view that the range
of  gender-focused  public  policies  implemented  over  the  last  few  decades  provides  a
complementary background, which contributes to the success of effectively implemented gender-
focused programs.  It is thus likely that further research aimed at improving our understanding of
25Chinese experiences can provide important lessons for the design of effective public policy in
this area.
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30Table la.  Data  Summary
Treatment  Control
Villages  Villages
Total Village=57  38  19
Sample size=6628 households  4719  1909
Household information (means)  t-test 3
Female education  6.48  6.66  1.68
Male education  7.42  7.71  2.80
No. Labour  2.22  2.14  4.35
Land size  6.20  6.85  2.72
Female Age  32.9  32.1  4.21
Male age  34.4  33.9  2.56
Family size  4.04  3.88  5.62
Main Occupation
Male:  Farming  75.6%  78.0%  2.09
Animal Husbandry  2.4%  0.8%  4.11
TVE  2.4%  2.2%  0.42
Other  19.7%  19.0%  0.65
Female: Farming  81.6%  83.9%  2.22
Animal husbandry  7.9%  7.0%  1.20
TVE  1.8%  0.3%  4.71
Others  8.7%  8.8%  0.06
Net annual income (median)  7962 (6000)  6285 (5000)  8.36
Per-capita income (median)  2049 (1500)  1659 (1250)  7.62
House quality (Brick structure)  71.6%  63.7%  6.31
Self ranking housing quality'  30.3%  16.1%  11.94
(top and above-average)
TV possession  45.4%  36.3%  6.73
Meat consumption level 2 (often)  71.7%  64.0%  6.15
Book expenditure (median)  85.0 (50)  66.9 (31)  5.44
Child education expenditure (median)  856.6 (500)  671.6 (400)  4.83
Information on Women  z-test 4
Participating community activities  62.9%  44.4%  13.82
Village cardre  5.8%  2.9%  4.90
Village active member  14.6%  7.0%  8.58
Political member  9.1%  9.0%  0.13
Participating cultural activity  45.1%  19.2%  19.73
Location
Northern region  42.7%  58.2%  11.46
South-West region  45.5%  30.9%  10.92
South-East region  11.8%  10.9%  1.07
31Gender/Fertility Attitudes
Gender bias  (boys>girls)  32.6%  47.4%  11.32
Gender bias (male labor>female labor)  30.8%  44.1%  10.34
Desire more birth if allowed  27.9%  44.3%  12.88
Have boy heir  50.1%  50.8%  0.51
Village Facilities (satisfactory access)
Road  64.4%  53.7%  8.08
Water system  61.6%  53.1%  6.38
School  86.8%  65.0%  20.31
Irrigation  69.3%  57.3%  9.24
Telephone facility  46.7%  31.8%  11.05
Clean public environment  62.2%  43.6%  13.87
Note: (1) Women were asked to rank the quality of their houses relative to others in the village across five
choices: top, above average, average, below average and poor quality. (2) This is measured by how often a
household consumes meat: everyday,  often and rarely. (3) t-test is for testing the equality of means from
two sets of villages, Ho: pt-  int=O,  where Pt and Pnt refer to population means of testing or non-testing
villages. (4) z-test  is for equality of proportions (for the response of being satisfied only).
32Table lb.  Variable Definitions and Explanations
Variable  Name  Definition  Explanation
Wife  education  Measured  by number  of years of  Enters  regressions  as series  of
formal  schooling  dummies  (as does  her age).
Husband  education  Same as above  Same  as above
Family  size  Total  number  of people  working  and  Enters  in log form  in regressions.
living  in  the same  household
Number  labourers  Number  of working  adults  Enters  with a level  and squared  term
in  regressions.
Land  size  Total  household  land holdings  Same  as above.
Income  Arnual income  Net of grain  used for own
consumption  and inputs
Vpd  Dummy  signifying  village  There  are 37 villages  in  the program
participating  in  the program  with  20 villages  used as control
villages
Ipd  Dummy  signifying  individual  Community  activities  include
participating  in community  activities  political  meetings,  cultural  and
entertainment  activities  (dancing
groups,  chess  groups  and sports
groups), agriculture  seminars.
Vpdlevel  (%)  Village-level  participation  The  proportion  of interviewees  in
each  village  who  participate
Village  Facilities  Dummies  signifying  whether  Facilities  included  were road,  water
answered  that  had satisfactory  system,  irrigation,  telephone,  school,
access  various  facilities  in village  and clean  public  environment
Occupation  Dummy  signifying  main  occupation  Occupations  include  farming,  animal
of husband  and  wife  husbandry,  township  and village
enterprise  (TVE),  and "other".
Region  Dummy  Dummy  signifying  region  where  North includes  Liaoning,  Jilin,
household's  village  located:  one of  Heilongjang,  Beijing,  Shanxi  and
North, Southwest  and Southeast  Hebei  provinces;  Southwest
regions  includes  Sichuan,  Hunan,  Yunnan,
Henan,  Hubei  and Shangdong
provinces;  Southeast  covers  Fujian,
Jiangsu  and Zhejiang  provinces.
33Table 2. Program Impact On Household Income
Cot-l  Col-2  Col-3  Col-4
Dependent  Variable  Log(income)  Log(income)  Log(income)  Vpd
Estimation Method  OLS  IV  OLS  Probit
Explanatory  variables
Treatment Dummy (Vpd)  0.194*  0.284*  0.202*
Village active members %  - *  -0.216*  26.4*
Age Dummies  *  *  *  *
Education  Dummies  *  *  *  *
Regional  Dummies  *  *  *  *
Other  Variables  *  *  *  *
R2  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.23
N  6628  6628  6628  6628
Note: * denotes estimates are statistically different from zero at 1% level.  Age and educational dummies
are for both wife and husband.  Other variables include family size, number of labourers, and land size.
34Table 3.  Introducing Individual Participation
Col-l  Col-2  Col-3  Col-4  Col-5  Col-6
Dependent variable  Ipd  Log (y)  Log(y)  Log(y)  Log(y)  Log(y)
Estimation method  Probit  OLS  OLS  IV  Heckman  Heckman
Sample  Full  Full  Full  Full  Participants  Non-participants
Explanatory variables
Program Dummy (Vpd)  0.638*  0.108*  -1.140*  0.172*  0.625*  -0.202***
Individual Participation  - 0.064**  -2.729*  0.143*  -
(Ipd)
Interaction (Vpd*lpd)  - 0.112*  2.863*
Boy Heir Dummy  -0.067**  - - 0.010  - -
Individual Cadre Dunimy  0.242*  - - -0.002  -
Village proportion of  - - - -0.223  -
active members (%)
Age Dummies  ***  *  *  *  *  *
Education  Dummies  *  *  *  *  *  *
Regional Dummies  *  *  *  *  *  *
Other Variables  *  *  *  *  *  *
Inverse  Mills Ratio  - - - - ***  insig.
R  2  0.04  0.225  0.219  0.225  - -
N  6628  6628  6628  6628  2813  3815
Note: *, **  and ***  denote estimates are statistically different from zero at 1%,  5% and 10%  levels.  Age
and educational dummies are for both wife and husband. Other variables include fanily  size, number of
labourers, and land size.
35Table 4. Externality Effect Through Village-Level Participation Rate
Participants  Non-Participants
Regression  Results
Program Durmy  (Vpd)  -0.818*  0.194
Interaction (Vpd*Vpdlevel)  1.886*  -0.554
Age Dummies  *  *
Education Dummies  *  *
Regional Dummies  *  *
Other variables  *  *
Inverse Mills' Ratio  *
Program  Impact  Evaluated  at:
Vpdlevel=0.45  0.031  -0.055
Vpdlevel=0.55  0.219  -0.111
Vpdlevel=0.65  0.408  -0.166
Note: *, ** and *** denote estimates are statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Age
and educational dummies are for both wife and husband.  Other variables include family size, number of
labourers, and land size.
36Table 5.  Program Social Externalities
Col-l  Col-2  Col-3  Col-4
Dependent  variable  Education  Gender  Gender  Desire  more
expenditure  preference  preference  Children
Log(Edu.exp)  (Boy > Girl)  (Male  labour  >  (yes=1,  no=0)
Female labour)
Estimation method  IV  Probit  Probit  Probit
Explanatory variables
Program  Dummy  107.8  -0.24*  -0.23*  -0.07*
Age Dummies  *  **  **  *
Education  Dummies  *  *  *  Insignificant
Regional  Dummies  *  *  *  *
Other  Variables  *  *  *  *
Has Boy Heir  dummy  - - - -0.05*
RB  0.08  0.07  0.03  0.06
N  6628  6628  6628  6628
Note: *, ** and ***  denote  estimates  are statistically  different  from zero  at 1%, 5% and 10%  levels. The
coefficients  in the final  three columns  are the marginal  effects  based on the probit  regression  coefficients.
Age and  educational  dummies  are for  both  wife and  husband. Other  variables  include  family  size,  number
of labourers,  and land size (and  a dummy  for having  a boy  heir in last column).
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